mind, despite the fact that there might be precious little or even no publicly observable evidence to support such a claim. How, then, are we to account for this incredible credibility that speakers have with respect to their own mental states? Contemporary philosophers have been understandably reluctant to follow Descartes and conclude that knowledge of our own minds is knowledge about a non-physical, inner realm to which we have a direct and incorrigible access, which is different in kind from the access we have to the external world and to the minds of others. For if the manner in which we have knowledge of other minds is so different from the way we know our own minds, then it becomes hard to see how the mental concepts we apply to ourselves could be the same as those we apply to others. Still, even if we avoid elevating this epistemological gulf into an ontological one, the puzzling fact of first-person authority remains to be explained--or explained away. Recently, Donald Davidson has suggested that an explanation of first-person authority naturally falls out of a proper understanding of interpretive constraints. 1 However, as is so characteristic of Davidson's work, these arguments are overly compressed and in desperate need of unpacking. His most extensive account of first-person authority occupies only a couple pages. In this paper, I'd like to explain why I find Davidson's discussion of the matter less than compelling.
I
At the very end of "First Person Authority," Davidson summarizes his argument as follows:
"There is a presumption -an unavoidable presumption built into the nature of "An interpreter of another's words and thoughts must depend upon scattered information, fortunate training, and imaginative surmise in coming to understand the other. The agent herself, however, is not in a position to wonder whether she is generally using her own words to apply to the right objects and events, since whatever she regularly does apply them to gives her words the meanings they Consider a speaker S who sincerely asserts, "I believe that p." By premise (I), it is presumed that S knows that it is the sentence "p" that S holds true. How so? Since
Davidson is reluctant to trace any asymmetry of knowledge between speakers and interpreters to premise (I), presumably the speaker knows this in the same way as his interpreters would, namely by its being displayed within the 'that'-clause of the self-ascription. At this point, premise (II) tells us that our speaker does not need to engage in any radical interpretation to know that "p" means that p for him, as he would, if this were a third-person ascription instead. So it would seem that S's assertion that "I (S) believe that p" does indeed have a special security for him that wouldn't apply to cases in which S makes third-person belief ascriptions. Far from delivering us an account of this more extensive authority, the argument I just presented on Davidson's behalf actually undermines it. For once again, let us suppose that a speaker S sincerely asserts, "I believe that p." Moreover, let us further suppose (and let's not pause to wonder how) that S's assertion is generally recognized as a first-person belief ascription. Premise (I) tells us that any arbitrary interpreter, including the speaker, will be in position to identify "p" as the sentence that S holds true.
But to get from that to the conclusion that "S believes that p," an interpreter would have to be in a position to know that "p" in the speaker's tongue means that p in the interpreter's tongue. And this is precisely what Davidson's remarks concerning premise (II) seem to block, for the knowledge that "p" disquotes is secure only when one is trying to make sense of one's own terms. Indeed, when speakers need to make their meanings clear to others, they are well-advised to do much more than simply stutter (or disquote). Sidney Shoemaker attempts to link first-person authority to broad constraints on rationality. 4 For a creature to be rational, he claims that it must on the whole know the methods by which to test the truth of its beliefs. But as he sees it, this in turn requires the beliefs of rational subjects to be "self-intimating;" in order to know how to check the truth of their beliefs, they must be able to determine which beliefs they have. So to rationally believe that p, it follows that rational subjects must have the belief that they believe that p. While self-intimation amounts to the mind's being transparent to itself, Shoemaker deftly observes that if the absence of beliefs is also self-intimating, then subject's beliefs about their beliefs will turn out to be reliable. Thus first-person authority follows from the extension of self-intimation to the absence of belief.
Unfortunately I cannot accept Shoemaker's route through self-intimation either. His picture of rational belief revision requires creatures to have an awareness of their beliefs, which suggests that for creatures to rationally hold any beliefs at all, they must possess the concept of belief. Such a view implausibly threatens to turn the concept of belief into a ground-level concept, the possession of which would be required for a creature to possess any concepts whatsoever. 5 Another strategy would be to argue that first-person ascriptions of belief are especially secure from challenge, because they make relatively little substantial claims about how the world is. Arthur Collins adopts this general strategy in The Nature of Mental Things, where he suggests that first-person ascriptions of the belief that p register a modest acknowledgement that one would be mistaken if p turned out not to be the case. 6 Since such statements serve more to withdraw one's full commitment to a claim than to take a stance on how things are, there is little positive content remaining in the self-ascription for the subject to be mistaken about in the event the claim is challenged.
Self-ascriptions of belief thus function like statements about how things "look" or "appear" to subjects. Obviously, one might object that "belief"-talk should not be assimilated to "looks"-talk, because subjects can believe that things are other than they appear to be. But on top of that, this proposed analysis suffers from the decisive disadvantage that unless we regard belief attributions as generally non-factual discourse, then self-ascriptions of belief have surprisingly different contents from third-person ascriptions, making it hard to see how subjects could ever agree or disagree with the third-person belief ascriptions made of them. The proposal also looks unappealing when we consider embedded self-ascriptions of belief. For on the proposed analysis, one's attributing to oneself the belief that p would seemingly emphasize the possibility that one's belief that they believe that p could be mistaken. Far from explaining first-person authority, such an admission appears to wind up denying any presumption of first-person authority altogether.
VI
My preferred strategy would be to tie first-person authority directly to logical and inferential peculiarities surrounding the concept of belief. If we subscribe to the broadly Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief has been introduced to refer to those functional states of subjects responsible for the production of intelligent behavior in general, and linguistic behavior in particular, then as long as creatures can report when they are disposed to assert or deny certain propositions, then they can easily be trained to report the presence of their beliefs. For the evidence that one has for one's believing that p is just the same evidence that one has for asserting "p." So let's suppose one last time that S sincerely asserts, "I believe that p." And let's further assume that this assertion is generally regarded as a self-ascription of belief. This latter assumption is necessary in order to rule out certain conditions that would undermine any alleged first-person authority. Specifically, it allows us to presume that S understands that this ascription refers to himself, that he understands that "p" is the content of the ascribed belief, and most importantly, that S grasps the concept of belief.
But now observe that creatures with an appropriate grasp of the concept of belief would understand that sincerely ascribing to oneself the belief that p practically commits them to defending the truth of "p." For speakers are obliged to defend the truth of their claims, and the best evidence for defending the claim that one believes that p is simply to assent to the sentence "p," as well as to challenge the truth of any claim obviously incompatible to it. Clearly, third-person ascriptions of belief do not afford speakers this additional avenue of justification for one's belief ascriptions. Herein lies the asymmetry between first-and third-person ascriptions of belief, which manifests itself in the appearance of first-person authority. 7 Given the assumption that S recognizes that his claim is a selfascription of belief, interpreters may conclude that S presumably understands that his self-ascription practically commits himself to the truth of "p." But on the conception of belief outlined above, one's being committed to defending the truth of a claim is prima facie evidence that one does indeed believe that statement. So S's sincere self-ascription provides evidence that S is disposed to assent to "p," and so turns out to be evidence of its own truth. First-person "authority" is therefore secured. KOM) . 2 Diagrammed, the argument looks as follows:
